Cryptography

# Evidence that still checks out years later

An AI action takes seconds. Someone may need to check its record years later. The signature is part of that job, but so are the keys, software and handover.

19 August 2026 · 3 min read

Updated 28 October 2026

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[Think about the later review](#future-review)[Know what the signature adds](#signature)[Keep the trust material](#custody)[Plan for change](#migration)[Try a small handover now](#test)[Sources and further reading](#sources)

## Think about the later review

Imagine handing an old AI-action record to an auditor. They have the file, but the original system has been replaced and the person who configured it has moved on. Can they still check it?

A record needs more than a reassuring filename. evidence-final-v7.json is an administrative tradition, not a security control. Keep the verification method, relevant public keys and software information alongside the evidence.

## Know what the signature adds

A digital signature lets a reviewer check whether signed content verifies under a particular public key. If a signed value changes, verification should fail. That is a useful integrity check. It does not make every statement in the record true.

Athena Enterprise, available for evaluation, uses ML-DSA-65 for post-quantum-capable evidence sealing. Coming to hosted Athena. ML-DSA is standardised by NIST in FIPS 204 and addresses a threat model that includes a sufficiently capable quantum computer. It is not a promise that the whole system is unbreakable.

## Keep the trust material

A public key included in the same file is not automatically a trusted key. Reviewers need a reliable way to establish which key belongs to the signer and which period or use it covers.

Document who can sign, how keys are protected and rotated, and how a later reviewer obtains the right verification material. Keep old verification material when old records still need it. Deleting it during a tidy-up can make that tidy-up surprisingly expensive.

## Plan for change

Algorithms, libraries and formats change. Record the scheme and version used. Agree how long evidence must remain checkable and how you will handle changes to the cryptographic standard or implementation.

Re-signing or adding a later attestation needs a documented process. A new signature does not, on its own, repair an old record whose history is already uncertain. Preserve the original material and explain what each later check establishes.

## Try a small handover now

Export a sample record and the required trust material. Ask another person to check it on a separate machine using the compatible verifier. Change a signed value and check that the altered copy fails.

Then write down what had to be available for the check to work. That is the start of a retention plan people can use, rather than a promise that someone will work it out in five years.

## Sources and further reading

Originally published 19 August 2026. Rewritten on 28 October 2026.

[NIST FIPS 204](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final)

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